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Abstract
The extant literature on price promotions typically assumes that
consumers loyal to a brand never switch to a competing brand, with
Shilony (1977) and Raju et al (1990) being exceptions. Extending
the Narasimhan (1988) model, we allow loyal consumers to hold finite
brand loyalty. Our unique equilibrium splits into three types, depend-
ing upon configurations of consumer reservation utility, brand strength
and switcher population. The type of equilibrium for high brand loy-
alty corresponds to the one in Narasimhan (1988). The remaining
two types for intermediate and low brand loyalty demonstrate strik-
ingly different properties. First, the strong brand has a higher price
range and a higher regular price. Second, the strong brand has a
higher (lower) average promotional depth than the weak brand when
the switcher population is small (large). Third, both brands promote
equally frequently when brand loyalty is relatively low. Therefore, this
analysis hopefully provides a more complete picture about firms’ pro-
motional decisions for all possible levels of brand loyalty and switcher
pupulation. (Key Words: Price promotions; Brand loyalty; Private
labels)
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1 Introduction
Marketing researchers usually explain price dispersion through models with
mixed-strategy equilibria. In the literature on competitive price promotions,
it is typically assumed that each firm has a captive customer base over which
it can act as a monopoly, and that all firms also face a common pool of mo-
bile customers for which they may compete on the sole basis of price (e.g.,
Narasimhan 1988, Colombo and Morrison 1989, McGahan and Ghemawat
1994, Simester 1997, Lal and Villas-Boas 1996, 1998, Chen et al. 2001a,
2001b, Iyer and Pazgal 2003)1. Each firm has its own base of ”loyal cus-
tomers” who are willing to purchase its product at a price not exceeding
their reservation utility, and the firm(s) with the lowest price will attract the
remaining ”switchers” or price shoppers. In these models, therefore, each
firm may choose to either serve only its captive consumers at the monopoly
price or to serve both the mobile and its own captive consumers at the lowest
market price, and the firms’ attempt to achieve a balance between these two
options results in mixed pricing strategies.
Obviously, such a dichotomous demand specification intends to capture
the heterogeneity in consumers’ sensitivity to prices and brands. Besides, in
the presence of price-sensitive switchers, the requirement that the loyal con-
sumers do not switch also plays a crucial role in ensuring a more tractable
analysis2. However, the assumption that the loyal consumers are always cap-
tive does not appear to reflect accurately the impact of brand loyalty on
1A similar demand structure also frequently appears in the economic literature on
consumer search. For example, in Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980), Rosenthal
(1981), Png and Hirshleifer (1987) and Baye and Morgan (2001), some consumers have
prohibitively high search costs and are thus ”uninformed”, while the remaining consumers
have zero search costs and are ”informed” about the prices charged by all firms. Each firm
secures at least an equal share of business from the uninformed buyers, while the informed
buyers only patronize the firm(s) with the lowest price.
2In a duopoly model with switchers, each firm’s payoff function has only one point of
discontinuity (when the two firms’ prices are equal) if the loyal consumers can not switch
under the absolute-loyalty assumption, but the number of discontinuities becomes two if
the loyal consumers can switch under a finite-loyalty assumption to be described shortly.
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cross-price elasticity. In many product or service markets, a substantial frac-
tion of the consumers that would remain loyal to a brand under normal cir-
cumstances switch to a competing brand when the latter offers a sufficiently
deep discount. Amazon.com is often imputed to be the strongest brand in
online book retailing, but the price premium it can enjoy is still limited to a
few dollars per title (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). To our knowledge, the
observation of finite brand loyalty has previously been incorporated into the
theoretical models by Shilony (1977), Raju et al. (1990) and Rao (1991).
In a duopoly where there are switchers and where the two brands differ
in loyal segment size, the present paper examines how finite brand loyalty
held by loyal consumers may affect the firms’ price promotional decisions.
Following Pessemier (1959), Jacoby and Chestnut (1978) and Raju et al
(1990), we define the brand strength of a firm as the minimum price discount
offered by some competitor to cause the former’s loyal customers to defect.
Specifically, we consider competition between a strong brand and a weak
brand. The strong brand has a segment of loyal customers and the remaining
consumers are switchers and not attached to either brand. Thus one may
regard the strong brand as a national or well-established brand, and the weak
a private label or new brand. Our model allows brand strength to be below
consumer reservation utility so that consumers loyal to the strong brand will
switch to the weak brand if the latter offers a discount exceeding the former’s
brand strength.
Therefore, our model has three key elements, namely asymmetric loyal
segments, presence of switchers and finite brand loyalty. Our model thus
combines the main features of three well-known models in the promotions
literature: Narasimhan (1988) (for asymmetric loyal segments and presence
of switchers), Shilony (1977) and Raju et al. (1990) (for finite brand loyalty).
We next compare with each of the three in greater detail.
(A) Narasimhan (1988). Assuming that consumers loyal to a brand
never switch, Narasimhan (1988) presents a simple and yet elegant model
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consisting of two brands with asymmetrically-sized loyal segments and a seg-
ment of switchers. He focuses on how asymmetric loyal segments drive differ-
ent pricing strategies. His major results include: (1) Both firms price in the
same continuous range and thus have the same regular price3; (2) The strong
brand promotes less frequently than the weak brand; and (3) On average,
the strong brand charges a higher price, but the two brands offer discounts
of the same depth.
Compared with Narasimhan (1988), our model retains the presence of
switchers and asymmetry in loyal segment size, but allows brand loyalty to
fall below consumer reservation utility4. The unique mixed-strategy equi-
librium in our model divides into three types corresponding to high, inter-
mediate and low brand strength, respectively. The original equilibrium in
Narasimhan (1988) emerges as the type for high brand strength, where it is
feasible but not profitable for the weak brand to attract the loyal consumers
of the strong brand. The two types of equilibria for intermediate and low
brand strength demonstrate strikingly different properties than the one for
high brand strength. First, the price range of the strong brand is always
higher than that of the weak brand, in that both the maximum and mini-
mum prices of the former are greater than those of the latter, respectively5.
If we interpret a brand’s maximum price as its regular price, then the strong
3The result that both firms have the same price range does not seem sensitive to
the asymmetry in loyal segments. In Varian (1980), firms with symmetric shares of the
”uninformed” (and thus loyal) consumers also have identical price ranges in equilibrium.
4Since we normalize the loyal segment of the weak brand to zero, one may alternatively
view the loyal segment of the strong brand as the size difference between the two brands’
loyal segments.
5In our model the two brands are homogeneous in that they command identical con-
sumer reservation utility. Narasimhan (1988) also considers the case of differentiated
products in the sense that all consumers hold a higher reservation utility for one brand
than for the other (see pages 439-440), and shows that the better valued brand has a
higher price range. However, there the mechanism for generating asymmetric price ranges
is fundamentally different than ours. Since in his model each brand’s loyal consumers are
its captive demand, each brand always prices up to its reservation utility. Thus the price
range of the better-valued brand is higher than that of the other brand by precisely the
difference in their reservation utilities.
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brand charges a higher regular price. Second, the average promotional depth
of the strong brand is higher (lower) than that of the weak brand when the
population of switchers is small (large). Third, when brand strength is low
enough, neither brand’s strategy has a mass point, i.e., both brands may pro-
mote equally frequently. Fourth, the mean prices of both sellers are unimodal
functions of the switcher population.
The differences between these two types of equilibria and Narasimhan’s
arise from our assumption of finite, instead of absolute, brand loyalty. For
low and intermediate values of brand loyalty, in equilibrium consumers loyal
to the strong brand switch to the weak brand with positive probability. In
Narasimhan (1988), as the switcher population grows, even the strong brand
will have a greater incentive to attract the large chunk of switchers, thus
intensifying competition. This force is still present in our model. However,
assuming finite brand loyalty introduces a new force: When the switcher
population decreases, the weak brand has a stronger incentive to attract its
rival’s loyal customers by offering deep discounts, also intensifying competi-
tion. Therefore, in these two types of equilibria price competition is most
intense (relaxed) for extreme (intermediate) sizes of switcher population.
(B) Shilony (1977). Common to Shilony (1977) and our current model
is that both allow brand strength to fall below consumer reservation util-
ity. His symmetric equilibrium also divides into three types according to
the magnitude of brand strength. For high brand strength, a pure-strategy
equilibrium obtains at the monopoly price6. For intermediate and low values
of brand strength, mixed-strategy equilibria obtain, i.e., there is price dis-
persion. In particular, for low values of brand strength, the mixed strategy
has no mass points and competition is so fierce that no firm can price up to
consumer reservation utility.
Otherwise, Shilony’s model is very different than ours in that he exam-
ines a totally symmetric setting with no switchers. In his model, the firms
6This is due to the absence of price-sensitive switchers in his model.
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have equally-sized loyal segments. In our model, two brands with asym-
metric loyal segment sizes compete in the presence of switchers. We choose
to include switchers because in many markets there exists a non-negligible
fraction of consumers that are more sensitive to price than to brand name.
Consequently, our equilibrium has the following different features. Due to
the presence of switchers, all three types of equilibria demonstrate price dis-
persion. The two brands may have asymmetric strategy sets. In particular,
each firm’s price range (bounded by brand strength) is narrower than that in
Shilony (1977), where the price range is bounded by twice the brand strength
(except for the case of pure-strategy equilibrium). In addition, our results
on promotional frequency and depth are unique to the asymmetric setting.
As mentioned earlier, much of the extant literature adopts a dichotomized
demand specification. In comparison, Shilony’s approach may be viewed as a
compromise: there is only one group of consumers that are partially captive
to each firm; they can switch among the brands at some cost. Our model
still admits two distinct consumer groups, one partially captive to each brand
and the other completely mobile.
(C) Raju (1988) and Raju et al. (1990). Raju (1988) and Raju
et al. (1990) extend Shilony (1977) to an asymmetric setting by allowing
different brands to command different degrees of consumer loyalty. As in
Shilony (1977), there are no switchers and each of the two firms has its own
loyal segment in these two papers. Raju’s model assumes that the strong
brand can always attract consumers loyal to the weak brand, and separately
considers two scenarios depending on whether the weak brand can also attract
consumers loyal to the strong brand. In both scenarios, Raju finds that the
strong brand promotes less often and that the two brands have the same
regular price (at consumer reservation utility) (Chapters 2 and 3 of Raju
1988, Propositions 6 and 11 of Raju et al. 1990). When brand disparity is
large so that the weak brand can not profitably attract those loyal to the
strong brand (whether the two loyal segments are equally sized or not), he
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also finds that the strong brand offers a higher average discount and that
the lowest price of the strong brand is below that of the weak brand. When
the two loyal segments are equally-sized and brand disparity is small so that
the weak brand can also sell to those consumers loyal to the strong brand,
Raju finds that it is the weak brand that offers a larger discount (Chapter
4 of Raju 1988, Proposition 12 of Raju et al 1990). Therefore, his result
on promotional depth is contingent on the relative strength between the two
brands. In addition, the strategies of both brands always have a mass point
at consumer reservation utility (due to the absence of switchers), and the
strategy set of the strong brand always contains a gap.
As in Raju’s model, we consider competition between two brands with
finite brand loyalty. However, our model has two key differences. First, the
distinction between the strong and weak brands is made on the basis of loyal
segment size in our model (and also Narasimhan’s), but is made on the ba-
sis of relative brand strength in Raju’s papers. Second, our model contains
switchers, while Raju’s model does not. Consequently, our model reveals
some different promotional dynamics. The regular and lowest prices of the
strong brand are always at or higher than those of the weak brand. Our
result on promotional depth is also very different. When brand strength is
high so that the weak brand can not attract consumers loyal to the strong
brand, both brands offer the same average discount. Otherwise, the strong
brand offers a higher (lower) average discount than the weak brand when
the switcher population is small (large). Therefore, we find that when brand
strength is not very high so that the weak brand can attract the loyal con-
sumers of the strong brand, which brand offers higher discounts depends on
the population of switchers. In our model, the weak brand’s strategy never
has a mass point and the strong brand’s strategy set never contains a gap.
Our result on promotional frequency is basically consistent with Raju’s.
We show that the strong brand promotes less often in two of the three types
of equilibria, and that both brands promote equally frequently when brand
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strength is relatively low.
In addition, Rao (1991) also allows brand loyalty to fall below consumer
reservation utility. Unlike the other models, Rao (1991) assumes that the
loyal consumers have different, continuous grades of brand loyalty. The plus
side of this treatment is its proximity to reality, but it also appears to make
the analysis less tractable.
This paper is planned as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 contains the analysis and the key results. In Section 4, we discuss issues in
empirically testing the results, as well as the implications of this research on
acquiring loyal customers and enhancing brand strength. Section 5 concludes.
Proofs missing from the text are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A commodity product market consists of two sellers and a unit mass of infin-
itesimal consumers. Consumers each have a unitary demand for the product
subject to the same reservation utility r, and have complete information
about the market prices.
We assume that seller 1 has a stronger brand name than seller 2 and that
consumers differ in their brand loyalty, in the following sense. Denote seller
i’s price as pi, i = 1, 2. A fraction α (0 < α < 1) of the consumers are
”switchers”. A switcher is indifferent to brands and always purchases from
the lower-priced seller. In the case of a price tie, she picks either seller with
equal probability. The remaining 1− α fraction of consumers are ”loyal” to
seller 1’s product. A loyal consumer will purchase from seller 1 if p1−p2 < c,
where c > 0 measures the brand strength of seller 1 relative to seller 2, will
choose either brand with equal probability if p1 − p2 = c, and will purchase
from seller 2 if p1 − p2 > c. Since we suppress the loyal segment size of the
weak brand to zero, 1− α may alternatively be viewed as the size difference
between the loyal segments of the two brands. To emphasize the role of brand
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asymmetry in causing price promotion, we assume that the two firms have
the same level of constant marginal cost, normalized to zero without loss of
generality.
Here the major difference between our model and the existing ones is that
we allow seller 1’s brand strength, c, to be below the consumer reservation
utility r. This opens the possibility that the loyal consumers of the strong
brand will switch to the weak brand if the latter offers a sufficiently lower
price. Since the weak brand (seller 2) does not have a loyal clientele, the
asymmetric duopoly we model here may be conceived as a national brand
versus a private label or store brand (as in Rao 1991), or an established brand
versus a new brand.
Thus, for any 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ r, each seller’s demand is
q1(p1, p2) =

1 if p1 < p2
1− α/2 if p1 = p2
1− α if p2 < p1 < p2 + c
(1− α)/2 if p1 = p2 + c
0 if p1 > p2 + c
,
and
q2(p1, p2) = 1− q1(p1, p2).
Here the demand specification at p1 = p2 and p1 = p2 + c does not
affect our equilibrium, where we will see these two events occur with zero
probability. Each seller’s profit function is therefore
wi(p1, p2) = piqi(p1, p2), for i = 1, 2.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
First, it is easy to see that this game does not have any pure-strategy equi-
librium. Apparently, the price of either firm is bounded between 0 and r.
If p1 > p2 + c, then firm 1 has zero sales but can do better by deviating to
p2 + c or below. If p2 < p1 ≤ p2 + c, then firm 2 will have the incentive to
deviate to p2 + ε < p1, where ε > 0. If p1 ≤ p2, then firm 2 will benefit from
deviating to p1 − ε. Since these three cases form a partition to the space of
pure strategies, the desired statement follows.
Proposition 1 There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this game.
Our key task in the remainder of Section 3 is to show that there exists a
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in this game. We shall establish existence
by identifying the mixed-strategy equilibrium7. Its uniqueness follows from
the construction process.
Specifically, we are interested in identifying a cumulative distribution
function F ∗i (pi) and an associated set, Pi, of prices with which firm i charges
with positive density, for i = 1, 2, such that∫
Pi
∫
Pj
wi(pi, pj)dF
∗
i (pi)dF
∗
j (pj) ≥
∫
Pi
∫
Pj
wi(pi, pj)dFi(pi)dF
∗
j (pj),
where j = 1, 2, and j 6= i.
Denote the (expected) profit function of seller i when seller j plays its
equilibrium strategy F ∗j (pj) as
Πi(pi) =
∫
Pj
wi(pi, pj)dF
∗
j (pj).
7An alternative approach to proving the existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium in this
game is by adapting Theorem 5b of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), which considers the case
in which the only discontinuity occurs at p1 = p2. However, a slight modification of the
theorem to include a second point of discontinuity at p1 = p2 + c is straightforward.
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The notion of an equilibrium requires that for i = 1, 2, each pi ∈ Pi yields the
same level of expected profit, pii say, and that each pi /∈ Pi yields an expected
profit strictly less than pii. That is, Πi(pi) = pii for pi ∈ Pi and Πi(pi) < pii
otherwise. We observe that pi1 > 0 and pi2 > 0. To see this, note that seller
1 can always make a positive profit by selling only to its loyal consumers at
price c. Therefore pi1 > 0, which implies that p1 > 0 always. Seller 2 will
also price strictly above zero, since it can attract all switchers at price p1−ε.
Hence, pi2 > 0.
Through Lemmas 1-4 below, we first establish some basic properties of
the equilibrium regarding the strategy sets Pi and the possibility of mass
points in F ∗i .
Lemma 1 There is no mass point in F ∗2 , and the only possible mass
point in F ∗1 occurs at r.
Lemma 1 says that F ∗2 is continuous and that the only possible disconti-
nuity in F ∗1 occurs at r. Because the continuity of Πi(p) is determined by the
continuity of F ∗j (p), by this Lemma Π1(p) is always continuous, and Π2(p)
will be discontinuous at r and r − c if F ∗1 has a mass at r.
Lemma 2 supP2 ≤ supP1 < supP2+c, and inf P2 ≤ inf P1 ≤ inf P2+c.
This Lemma is rather straightforward in light of the demand specification
in our model: Any price exceeding supP2 + c or below inf P2 is a dominated
strategy for seller 1, and any price exceeding supP1 or below inf P1 − c is a
dominated strategy for seller 2.
Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly lead to the next Proposition.
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium in this game is one of the following three
types: (1)Type-I: supP1 = supP2 = r, with F
∗
1 having a mass point at
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r; (2)Type-II: supP2 < supP1 = r with F
∗
1 having a mass at r; and (3)
Type-III: supP2 < supP1, with neither firm’s strategy having a mass point.
α
r
c
Figure 1
t(α)
s(α)
1
1.5
2
1
I
II
III
0
Lemma 3 For any p, we can find ε > 0 such that if (p, p+ε) ⊂ P1, then
either (p, p+ε) ⊂ P2 or (p− c, p− c+ε) ⊂ P2. For any p, we can find ε > 0
such that if (p, p+ε) ⊂ P2, then either (p, p+ε) ⊂ P1 or (p+c, p+c+ε) ⊂ P1.
Lemma 3 can be readily shown by contradiction. Suppose (p, p+ε) ⊂ P1,
(p, p+ε)∩P2 = φ and (p−c, p−c+ε)∩P2 = φ. Then Π1 would be increasing
over (p, p + ε), contradicting the equal-profit condition for (p, p + ε) ⊂ P1.
From this, the first statement of the Lemma follows. The argument for the
second statement is analogous. The next lemma shows that the spread of
each strategy set Pi is bounded by 2c.
Lemma 4 supPi − inf Pi < 2c.
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In the technical Appendix, this Lemma is used to establish an even tighter
bound on each firm’s price range (supPi − inf Pi < c).
3.2 The Price Equilibrium
Proposition 2 above has identified all three possible types of equilibria. Which
type will realize turns out to depend on the parameter values along two di-
mensions, r/c and α (see Figure 1). Here α is the population of switchers and
r/c is a measure of seller 1’s brand strength relative to consumer reservation
utility–the weaker the brand strength, the higher this ratio is. Type I (II,
III) equilibrium obtains in Region I (II, III, respectively) of Figure 1. We
next describe each type of equilibrium and discuss its key properties.
Proposition 3 (Type-I Equilibrium) When r/c ≤ s(α) ≡ (1 − α +
α2)/(1− 2α+ 2α2), there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium
F ∗1 (p) =
{
1− r(1−α)
p
for r(1− α) ≤ p < r
1 for p ≥ r ,
F ∗2 (p) =
1
α
[
1− r(1−α)
p
]
for r(1− α) ≤ p < r .
In this equilibrium, supP1 = supP2 = r, and F
∗
1 has a mass of 1− α at r.
Type-I equilibrium obtains when the magnitude of seller 1’s brand equity
is sufficiently high (c ≥ r/s(α)). It has the following key features: (1) Both
sellers price in the same range, and thus have the same regular price (at or
arbitrarily close to r) and the same lowest price. (2) The strategy of the
strong brand has a mass 1 − α at r. Thus the strong brand promotes less
frequently. (3) Since F ∗1 (first-degree) stochastically dominates F
∗
2 , Ep1 >
Ep2, i.e., on average the strong brand enjoys a price premium over its rival.
(4) E[p1|p1 < r] = E[p2|p2 < r], i.e., the average depth of discount is the same
for both sellers. Type-I equilibrium therefore has the same set of essential
spirits as the one in Narasimhan (1988) developed under the assumption
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that a loyal customer is captive to her favored brand. This resemblance is
not surprising after some closer examination of the condition in Proposition
3: r/c ≤ s(α) implies r/c ≤ 1/α, under which supP1 − inf P2 = αr ≤ c.
Therefore, in Type-I equilibrium the loyal consumers of seller 1 are de facto
”captive,” in the sense that they will never purchase from seller 2. Although
seller 2 can potentially attract seller 1’s loyal consumers at a positive price,
it is to seller 2’s best interest just to sell to the switchers.
From Proposition 3, we can readily derive the following comparative sta-
tics. The expected profits are pi1 = r(1 − α) and pi2 = r(1 − α)α. Seller
1’s profit is what it would earn by serving only its loyal consumers at a
price equal to their reservation utility. The expected prices are Ep1 =
r(1 − α)(1 − ln(1 − α)) and Ep2 = −r(1 − α)/α ln(1 − α). Since in this
type of equilibrium the loyal consumers always buy from seller 1, Ep1 is also
the mean price they face. The switchers always buy at the lower price, which
has a distribution function G(p) = 1 − (1 − F ∗1 (p))(1 − F ∗2 (p)), and face an
expected price r[2(1− α) + (1− α)2/α ln(1− α)].
In Type-I equilibrium, as α increases from zero to 1, price competition
intensifies because a larger segment of switchers becomes more appealing to
both sellers. The following holds as α increases: (1) both Ep1 and Ep2 de-
crease, (2) the lower bound of the common price range decreases, and (3) pi2
increases when α ≤ 0.5 and decreases when α > 0.5, while pi1 decreases. Not
surprisingly, a larger switcher segment hurts the profit of the strong brand.
Since in Type-I equilibrium seller 2 sells only to the switchers, its sales are
diminished when α is small. When α approaches 1, price competition be-
comes very fierce (Ep1 −→ 0 and Ep2 −→ 0). This explains the unimodality
of pi2.
Proposition 4 (Type-II Equilibrium) When s(α) < r/c < t(α), there is
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a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium8
F ∗1 (p) =

1− pi2
αp
for pi2
α
≤ p < pi1
1−α
1
1−α
[
1− pi2
p−c
]
for pi1
1−α ≤ p < r
1 for p ≥ r
,
F ∗2 (p) =

1− pi1
(1−α)(p+c) for
pi1
1−α − c ≤ p < r − c
1− pi1
r(1−α) for r − c ≤ p < pi2α
1
α
[
1− pi1
p
]
for pi2
α
≤ p < pi1
1−α
1 for p ≥ pi1
1−α
,
where
pi1 =
c(1− α)
2α2
(
α2 − θ(1− α)2 +
√
(α2 − θ(1− α)2)2 + 4α2θ(1− α)
)
,
pi2 =
1
1−α
αpi1
+ 1
r(1−α)
, and θ ≡ r
c
.
In this equilibrium, seller 1’s strategy has a mass at supP1 = r.
Type-II equilibrium obtains for intermediate values of brand loyalty (i.e.,
r/t(α) < c < r/s(α)), and F ∗1 and F
∗
2 are graphed in Figure 2. In Type-II
equilibrium, seller 1’s strategy has a mass of (pi2 − α(r− c))/[(1− α)(r− c)]
at r, meaning that the strong brand still promotes less frequently than the
weak brand, just as in Type-I equilibrium. From Proposition 4, we obtain
the following distinguishing properties of Type-II equilibrium.
Proposition 5 In Type-II equilibrium, (1) supP2 < supP1 = r, inf P2 <
inf P1, supP1 − inf P1 < supP2 − inf P2 = c; (2) P2 is nonconvex.
8t(α) = 13(1−3α+3α2) (7α
2 − 7α+ 2− 2
1
3 h
k +
k
2
1
3
), where h = −4+19α−35α2+26α3−4α4,
k =
(
16 − 114α + 342α2 − 521α3 + 387α4 − 87α5 − 16α6 + √3α(3(1 − 3α +
3α2))
√−4 + 36α− 112α2 + 168α3 − 117α4 + 32α5
) 1
3
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Figure 2
pi1
1−α − c r− c pi2α pi11−α r
F∗2
F∗1
Part (1) of the Proposition implies that supP1 − inf P2 > c. Therefore,
the strong brand’s loyal consumers are no longer captive and will purchase
from the weak brand with positive probability. Following the convention
in the literature, we interpret supPi as firm i’s regular price. Then the
strong brand has a higher regular price than the weak brand. Seller 2 has a
nonconvex strategy set and will not charge any price in [r− c, pi2/α]. Despite
supP1 − inf P1 < supP2 − inf P2, we can verify that the price ranges of the
two sellers have the same effective length r − pi2/α, due to the gap in P2.
We now compare the mean promotional depth of the two sellers. We
measure seller i’s promotional depth as the difference between its regular
price and the mean of its price below its regular price, i.e., supPi−E[pi|pi <
supPi]. We then have
supP1 − E[p1|p1 < supP1] = r − Ep1 − r(1− Pr(p1 < r))
Pr(p1 < r)
and
supP2 − E[p2|p2 < supP2] = supP2 − Ep2,
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where the second equality is due to the lack of mass point in seller 2’s strategy.
The exact expressions of Ep1 and Ep2 are given in the Appendix. Through
numerical methods, we obtain the next Proposition.
Proposition 6 In Type-II equilibrium, seller 1 has a larger (smaller) aver-
age promotional depth than seller 2 when α is relatively small (large).
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows. When the switcher
population is relatively small, seller 2, the weak brand, has a strong incentive
to invade seller 1’s loyal segment by offering discounts deeper than c (see the
discussion after Proposition 7 below). Since seller 1 has a higher regular
price than seller 2 (supP1 = r > supP2), it is forced to offer discounts that
on average exceeds seller 2’s in order to defend its loyal customer base. On
the other hand, when the switcher population is large, seller 2’s regular price
(supP2 = pi1/(1− α)) become closer to seller 1’s regular price (r), but seller
1 has a strong incentive to attract the switchers. This forces seller 2 to offer
a higher average discount to prevent losing too many switchers to its rival.
Figure 3 depicts the average promotional depth of the two sellers for r = 1.55,
c = 1, and 0 < α < 0.636. The same pattern of relative promotional depth
between the two sellers holds for other parameter configurations of Type-II
Equilibrium.
Proposition 6 compares the promotional depth of the two brands in Type-
II equilibrium, where seller 1’s brand equity is not very strong relative to
seller 2’s. This Proposition directly contrasts with our Type-I equilibrium or
Narasimhan (1988), where the two brands have the same average promotional
depth. Proposition 12 of Raju et al (1990) also addresses the case in which
neither brand is very strong relative to the other so that each brand actively
attracts consumers loyal to the other, and finds that it is the weaker brand
that offers a larger discount. The difference between their conclusion and
ours is mainly due to their assumption of equally-sized loyal segments. We
can verify that when α = 0.5 in our model, the weak brand also offers a
higher average discount.
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The two sellers’ price ranges overlap in [pi2/α, pi1/(1−α)). We can verify
that E[p1|pi2/α ≤ p1 < pi1/(1 − α)] = E[p2|pi2/α ≤ p2 < pi1/(1 − α)], i.e.,
they charge the same mean price in their overlapping price region. The two
sellers’ expected profits are given in Proposition 4. We can readily compute
the expected prices of the sellers (Ep1 and Ep2) and the expected prices
paid by a loyal consumer and a switcher (Epl and Eps). The closed-form
expressions for these metrics are rather complex and thus relegated to the
Appendix. In Figure 4, we plot these metrics as functions of α for r = 1.55,
c = 1, and 0 < α < 0.636. The next Proposition summarizes some related
key comparative statics.
Proposition 7 In Type-II equilibrium, as α increases from zero, (1) the
mass of seller 1’s strategy at r, (pi2−α(r− c))/[(1−α)(r− c)], first increases
and then decreases; (2) both Ep1 and Ep2 first increase and then decrease.
Recall that in Type-I equilibrium, the mass of F ∗1 at r, Ep1 and Ep2 are
all monotonically decreasing in α. In contrast, they are all unimodal func-
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tions of α in Type-II equilibrium. Part (1) of Proposition 7 indicates that
extreme values of switcher population weaken the strong brand’s ability to
maintain its price at the regular level. Ep1 and Ep2 are graphed in Figure 4.
In Type-II equilibrium, when α gets smaller, seller 2 will be less content with
selling only to the thin slice of switchers, and more inclined to attract seller
1’s loyal consumers by offering discounts deeper than c. To better defend its
loyal segment, seller 1 is forced to lower its price correspondingly. On the
other hand, when α gets larger, even seller 1 itself has a stronger incentive to
compete for a fat share of switchers, again heating up competition. There-
fore, in Type-II equilibrium, price competition is most intensified for extreme
values of α, and is most relaxed for intermediate values of α. This explains
the unimodality of Ep1, Ep2 and the mass in F
∗
1 .
Lastly, pi1 is monotonically decreasing in α and pi2 is unimodal, just as
in Type-I equilibrium. Unlike Type-I equilibrium, however, here pi1(α) is
nonlinear (see Figure 4).
Proposition 8 (Type-III Equilibrium) When r/c ≥ t(α), there is a
19
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium:
F ∗1 (p) =
{
1− pi2
αp
for pi2
α
≤ p < pi1
1−α
1
1−α
[
1− pi2
p−c
]
for pi1
1−α ≤ p < pi2α + c
,
F ∗2 (p) =
 1−
pi1
(1−α)(p+c) for
pi1
1−α − c ≤ p < pi2α
1
α
[
1− pi1
p
]
for pi2
α
≤ p < pi1
1−α
where
pi1 =
c(1− α)2t(α)[t(α)− 1]
α+ (1− 2α)t(α) , and pi2 = cα(t(α)− 1).
In this equilibrium, supP2 < supP1 < r and neither firm’s strategy has a
mass point.
p
F∗i
1
pi1
1−α − c pi2α pi11−α pi2α + c
F∗2
F∗1
Figure 5
The equilibrium distribution functions are graphed in Figure 5. When
seller 1 has a relatively low brand strength (i.e., c ≤ r/t(α)), Type-III equi-
librium obtains, where competition is more intense than the other two types
of equilibria so that even the strong brand can not price up to consumer
reservation utility and that neither firm’s strategy contains a mass point.
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Both brands promote equally frequently in Type-III equilibrium. Compared
with Type-II equilibrium, P2 is now convex.
Otherwise, Type-III equilibrium shares many key features as Type-II
equilibrium. First, seller 1’s loyal consumers are not captive, as supP1 −
inf P2 > c. Second, seller 1 has a higher price range and a higher regular
price than seller 2, as supP2 < supP1 and supPi− inf Pi = c, i = 1, 2. Third,
both Ep1 and Ep2 are unimodal functions of α (cf. Proposition 7, part (2)).
We can also verify that E[p1|pi2/α ≤ p1 < pi1/(1 − α)] = E[p2|pi2/α ≤ p2 <
pi1/(1 − α)]. That is, the two sellers’ mean prices in their overlapping price
region are identical. The rationale underlying these properties also resem-
bles that in Equilibrium II. Lastly, the mean promotional depth of the strong
brand can be greater or smaller than that of the weak brand. However, unlike
Type-II equilibrium, here the critical value of α does not depend on either r
or c, as shown in the next Proposition.
Proposition 9 In Type-III equilibrium, seller 1 has a larger (smaller) av-
erage promotional depth than seller 2 when α < α∗ ' 0.442 (when α > α∗).
The key comparative statics of Equilibrium III are relegated to the Ap-
pendix. The price ranges and expected profits of the two sellers are plotted in
Figure 6. The grey area on the top (bottom) is seller 1’s (seller 2’s) exclusive
price range, and the dark grey area in the middle is the two sellers’ overlap-
ping price range. As α decreases, we see greater dispersion in the prices of
the two sellers because seller 2 becomes more aggressive in attracting seller
1’s loyal consumers by undercutting its price by more than c.
4 Discussions and Implications
In this Section we attempt to provide a synthesis of all three types of equi-
libria. We first examine how varying the values of α and c, respectively, will
impact each firm’s profits, and then discuss issues in empirically testing some
of the key results.
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4.1 Implications on Acquiring Loyal Customers
In reality, a firm may be able to convert some brand switchers into its loyal
customers, e.g., through persuasive advertising. We now turn our attention
to examining seller 1’s return from such customer acquisition efforts. In all
three types of equilibria, pi1 and pi2 are decreasing and unimodal functions
of α, respectively. Thus the strong brand always benefits from a larger loyal
customer base, but the weak brand does not always benefit from a larger
switcher population. However, seller 1 enjoys different rates of return from
customer acquisition in these three types of equilibria. In Type-I equilibrium,
pi1 increases linearly as α decreases, i.e., it receives constant marginal return
from converting switchers into its loyal customers. In the remaining two
types of equilibria, its returns in customer acquisition are nonlinear. In
particular, for small values of α, seller 1’s profit improves slowly as α further
decreases (see Figures 4 and 6). Therefore, when r/c > 1, seller 1’s customer-
acquisition effort may yield diminished return once its loyal customer base
becomes sufficiently large.
For example, suppose r = 1.55 and c = 1. When α ≤ 0.636, Type-II
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equilibrium obtains. We can verify that, at α = 0.30, seller 1 already makes
an expected profit of 0.958. Even if seller 1 could transform all the remaining
switchers into its loyal customers, its expected profit can only increase by
0.042 or 4.4%.
The fact that pi2 is unimodal in α suggests that when α is relatively high,
the weak brand will benefit from the strong brand’s effort to convert the brand
switchers into its own loyal customers . As was pointed out earlier, here the
reason is that a large proportion of switchers in the market intensifies price
competition and thus hurts both sellers’ profits. In such a case, efforts by
the strong brand in reducing α may benefit both brands.
0
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4.2 Implications on Enhancing Brand Strength
It is often believed that advertising can lead to product differentiation and
reduce consumers’ price sensitivity (e.g., Comanor and Wilson 1974, Mitra
and Lynch 1995, Kaul and Wittink 1995, Mela et al 1997 and Shum 2004).
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Over time a firm may be able to increase its brand equity through non-price-
oriented advertising and brand building. We now discuss the implications of
raising seller 1’s brand advantage c on both sellers’ profits. For any given
α and r, as c increases the equilibrium goes through Types III, II, and I.
The two sellers’ expected profits are shown as functions of c in Figure 7.
Raising seller 1’s brand strength will increase both sellers’ profits linearly in
Type III equilibrium and almost linearly in Type-II equilibrium. Therefore,
brand enhancement by seller 1 has positive externalities, as it also leads to a
higher expected profit for seller 2. That a stronger brand of seller 1 benefits
its competitor seems somewhat puzzling at first. The reason is that seller 1’s
brand strength c essentially measures the degree of product differentiation
perceived by its loyal consumers, and a higher c serves to soften price compe-
tition and thus benefits both sellers. In this sense enhancing seller 1’s brand
strength relaxes price competition in a manner reminiscent of raising the
product quality of the high-end firm in the vertically differentiated duopoly
of Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Moorthy (1988). For example, when c = 0,
Bertrand competition prevails and both sellers price at their marginal costs
(normalized to zero).
4.3 Empirical Analysis
One naturally wonders to what extent the results produced with our stylized
model can be replicated in reality. To empirically test our results, we can
offer the following considerations.
1. When the brand equity of the strong brand is moderate or low relative
to consumer reservation utility (as in Types II and III equilibria), our model
predicts that the strong brand enjoys a higher price range and a higher regular
price than the weak brand. Such a prediction appears to be supported by
casual observations in many product markets such as packaged goods and
grocery items, among others.
2. When the strong brand has a moderate or high brand equity (as in
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Types II and I equilibria), its strategy has a mass point while the weak
brand’s strategy does not, meaning that the former promotes less frequently
than the latter, consistent with Narasimhan (1988) and Raju et al. (1990).
In contrast, neither firm’s strategy has a mass point when the strong brand
has a relatively low brand equity (as in Type-III equilibrium). Therefore,
when the strong brand can not command a sufficiently high price premium
from its loyal consumers, it will be in a less favorable position to maintain its
regular price. Instead, it may be forced to offer discounts as frequently as its
competitor. This implies that in markets where no seller has a sufficiently
superior brand advantage, one is less likely to observe significant differences
in promotional frequency among the sellers. For example, this may be true
when consumers can examine a product and determine its quality with ease,
as brand names tend to be less important in such markets (Png and Reitman
1995).
Existing studies have produced different perspectives on the relative pro-
motional frequency between two asymmetric brands. Rao (1991) predicts
that the weak brand promotes less often than the strong brand, opposite to
Narasimhan (1988) and Raju et al. (1990). Therefore, the contrast between
their results may be reconciled, to a certain extent, by our result that the
two brands promote equally frequently when the strong brand possesses only
mild relative strength.
3. In Type-I equilibrium, the average promotional depths by the two
firms are equal, as in Narasimhan (1988). In the other two types of equilibria,
however, the promotional depth of one brand may be higher or lower than the
other, depending on the population of switchers. Blattberg and Wisniewski
(1989) find empirical evidence that in part supports our prediction: the mean
deal depth for national brands of tuna and flour exceeds that for private
labels.
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5 Conclusion
In the Narasimhan (1988) model consisting of a strong brand (seller 1) and
a weak brand (seller 2), this article has succeeded in relaxing a major as-
sumption employed in most previous studies on price promotion–namely,
consumers loyal to a brand are entirely captive to that particular brand. We
allow the relative strength of the strong brand to fall below consumer reserva-
tion utility. In this setting, a unique mixed-strategy price equilibrium exists
and falls into one of three possible types depending on the parameter con-
figuration of consumer reservation utility, brand strength, and the switcher
population. The type of equilibrium when seller 1’s brand equity is relatively
high corresponds to the original equilibrium obtained by Narasimhan (1988).
In this type of equilibrium, the loyal consumers are de facto captive. When
seller 1’s brand equity is moderate and low, respectively, two new types of
equilibria emerge in which seller 1’s loyal consumers purchase from seller
2 with positive probability. As shown above, these two types of equilibria
demonstrate very distinctive patterns than the first type. Therefore, it is our
hope that this analysis has provided a more complete picture about firms’
pricing and consumers’ choice behavior under finite brand loyalty.
We note that allowing finite brand loyalty has significantly complicated
our analysis, because each firm’s demand function is now discontinuous at
two points (when p1 = p2 and when p1 = p2 + c). In contrast, under the
usual assumption that the loyal consumers never switch, each firm’s demand
function is discontinuous only when p1 = p2. Lastly, our current model has
only considered two competing firms with different sizes of loyal clientele.
It may be potentially fruitful to carry out the current analysis in a sym-
metric duopoly or oligopoly. In particular, analysis of an oligopoly can help
shed additional light on how the number of players may impact each firm’s
promotional decisions in the presence of finite brand loyalty.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof: First, we show that seller 2’s strategy has no mass point. Suppose
instead that seller 2’s strategy has a mass w at p, then charging p gives seller
1 an expected profit
Π1(p) = p(1− F ∗2 (p)) + (1− α)p(F ∗2 (p)− F ∗2 (p− c)− w)
+(1− α/2)pw + p(1− α)/2Pr(p2 = p− c),
and charging p+  gives seller 1 an expected profit
Π1(p+ ) = (p+ )(1− F ∗2 (p+ )) + (1− α)(p+ )(F ∗2 (p+ )− F ∗2 (p+ − c))
+(1− α/2)(p+ )Pr(p2 = p+ ) + (p+ )(1− α)/2Pr(p2 = p+ − c).
Since F ∗2 (p) is a right continuous function, we have F
∗
2 (p + ) → F ∗2 (p),
F ∗2 (p+ − c)→ F ∗2 (p− c), Pr(p2 = p+ )→ 0 and Pr(p2 = p+ − c)→ 0
as  → 0. Thus, lim→0Π1(p) − Π1(p + ) = αwp/2 + p(1 − α)/2Pr(p2 =
p− c) ≥ αwp/2 > 0.
Similarly, we can show that lim→0Π1(p− )− Π1(p) > 0.
If p < r, the above analysis suggests that ∃δ > 0 such that [p, p+δ)∩P1 =
∅.
If p+ c < r, by the same method we can show that
lim
→0
Π1(p+ c)− Π1(p+ c+ ) = (p+ c)α/2Pr(p2 = p+ c) + (p+ c)(1− α)/2w
≥ (p+ c)(1− α)/2w > 0,
and that lim→0Π1(p+ c− )−Π1(p+ c) > 0.This indicates that ∃δ > 0 such
that [p+ c, p+ c+ δ) ∩ P1 = ∅.
When p < r, the above implies that seller 2 can always increase its profit
by moving its mass at p to p + δ1, where 0 < δ1 < δ, a contradiction to the
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assumption that seller 2’s strategy has a mass at p.
When p = r, supP1 = r since supP1 ≥ supP2. If F ∗1 has a mass at r, it’s
easy to show that lim→0Π2(p − ) > Π2(p). If F ∗1 doesn’t have a mass at
r , Π2(r) = 0. Therefore we can’t have r ∈ P2. We have show that seller 2’s
equilibrium strategy doesn’t contain a mass point.
Analogously, if seller 1’s equilibrium strategy has a mass at p < r, then we
can show that ∃δ > 0 such that [p, p+δ)∩P2 = ∅ and [p−c, p−c+δ)∩P2 = ∅,
which implies that seller 1 can increase its profit by moving its mass at p to
slightly above p, a contradiction. Thus, seller 1’s equilibrium strategy can’t
have a mass at p < r. Notice, however, it’s still possible for seller 1’s strategy
to have a mass at r. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof: Any price p1 > supP2 + c yields zero profit for seller 1, and any
price p2 > supP1 yields zero profit for seller 2. Hence, supP2 ≤ supP1 ≤
supP2 + c. Suppose supP1 = supP2 + c in equilibrium. Recall, Lemma 1
states that F ∗2 has no mass point, and that the only possible mass point of
F ∗1 is at r. Then at a price p immediately below supP1, firm 1 obtains a
profit Π1(p) = (1 − α)p[1 − F ∗2 (p − c)]. As p −→ supP1, Π1(p) −→ 0. This
contradicts the continuity of Π1(p) if supP1− ε /∈ P1 for an arbitrarily small
ε, and contradicts pi1 > 0 otherwise.
For seller 1, a price p1 < inf P2 is strictly dominated by p1 + ε < inf P2,
which implies inf P2 ≤ inf P1. Likewise, for seller 2, a price p2 < inf P1 − c is
strictly dominated by p2 + ε < inf P1 − c. This implies inf P1 ≤ inf P2 + c.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof: From Lemma 2, we have either supP2 = supP1 or supP2 < supP1.
We first show that if supP1 = supP2, then supP1 = supP2 = r and F
∗
1 has a
mass at r. Suppose supP1 = supP2. Then for a price p ∈ P2 that is slightly
below supP2, we have Π2(p) = [1− F ∗1 (p)]pα. If F ∗1 does not have a mass at
supP1, then Π2(p)→ 0 as p→ supP2, a contradiction to pi2 > 0. Further, by
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Lemma 1, the mass point in F ∗1 must be at r, and hence supP1 = supP2 = r.
This shows that Type-I equilibrium is one possible type of equilibrium.
When supP2 < supP1, F
∗
1 may or may not have a mass at r, suggesting
that both Types II and III equilibria are possible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof: Suppose that (p, p + ε) ⊂ P1, (p, p + ε) ∩ P2 = φ and (p − c, p −
c+ ε)∩P2 = φ. Then for p1 ∈ (p, p+ ε), Π1(p1) = [1−F ∗2 (p1)]p1+ [F ∗2 (p1)−
F ∗2 (p1− c)](1− α)p1. Since F ∗2 (p1) and F ∗2 (p1− c) are constant on (p, p+ ε),
Π1(p1) is an increasing function over this interval, violating the equal-profit
condition on (p, p + ε) ⊂ P1. This proves the first statement of the Lemma.
The second statement can be proved analogously. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof: The proof proceeds by iteratively deleting dominated strategies of
each seller.
We start with Si = [0, r] as the strategy space for each seller. By playing
p1 = c − , where  > 0 is arbitrarily small, seller 1 can guarantee a profit
(c− )(1− α). Thus for seller 1, any price p1 < (c− )(1− α) is dominated
by p1 = c − . So we update the lower bound of seller 1’s strategy space,
p1, to p1 = (c − )(1 − α). At price p2 = p1 − , seller 2 makes a profit of
(p1 − )α. Therefore, for seller 2, any price p2 < (p1 − )α is dominated by
price p2 = p1− , and we update the lower bound of seller 2’s strategy space,
p2, to p2 = (p1 − )α.
Now, for seller 1 p1 = p2+c− dominates any price below (p2+c−)(1−α),
and for seller 2 p2 = p1−  dominates any price below (p1− )α. So we make
the following updates: p1 = (p2 + c− )(1− α) and p2 = (p1 − )α.
If consumers’ reservation utility r is sufficiently high, this iteration process
will continue indefinitely, but (p1, p2) will converge. Solving the two equations
above simultaneously and letting  → 0, we see that (p1, p2) converges to
( c(1−α)
1−α+α2 ,
cα(1−α)
1−α+α2 ).
If the reservation utility r is not high enough, this iteration process will
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stop as soon as p2 > r − c. When p2 > r − c, for seller 1 a price p1 = r
dominates p1 < r(1−α). So we have p1 = r(1−α). Then for seller 2 a price
at r(1 − α) dominates any p2 < r(1 − α)α and so p2 = r(1 − α)α. For the
iteration to stop prematurely before converging to the limit ( c(1−α)
1−α+α2 ,
cα(1−α)
1−α+α2 ),
we have p2 = r(1 − α)α < cα(1−α)1−α+α2 , or equivalently r < c1−α+α2 ≤ 4c3 < 2c.
Since supPi ≤ r, we have supPi − inf Pi < 2c.
Next, we continue with the case in which (p1, p2) converges to (
c(1−α)
1−α+α2 ,
cα(1−α)
1−α+α2 ),
i.e., r ≥ c
1−α+α2 . We already know supP2 ≤ supP1 < supP2 + c by Lemma
2.
First, we consider the case when supP1 = supP2. When supP1 = supP2,
by Proposition 2, supP2 = supP1 = r and seller 1’s strategy has a mass point
at supP1 = r. Suppose r > c/α. Then pricing at p1 = r yields seller 1 a
profit r(1−α) if r− c < p2 < r, a profit (r− c)(1−α)/2 if p2 = r− c, and a
profit 0 otherwise, while pricing at p1 = r − c yields seller 1 a profit r − c if
r−c < p2 < r, a profit (r−c)(1−α/2) if p2 = r−c. Therefore, when r > c/α,
pricing at p1 = r is a dominated strategy for seller 1. This contradicts seller
1’s strategy having a mass at r. Therefore we must have r ≤ c/α. Suppose
r > c/(1− α). When pricing at p2 ∈ [max(c/(1− α), r− c), r), seller 2 earns
a profit p2α if p1 > p2, a profit p2α/2 if p1 = p2, and zero otherwise. When
pricing at p2 − c, seller 2 earns a profit p2 − c if p1 > p2, a profit p2(1 + α)/2
if p1 = p2. Hence for seller 2, any p2 ∈ [max(c/(1 − α), r − c), r) is weakly
dominated by p2 − c. Therefore, we must have r ≤ c/(1 − α). Combining
r ≤ c/α and r ≤ c/(1−α), we have r ≤ 2c for any α. Consequently, we have
supPi − inf Pi < 2c.
Second, consider the case when supP2 < supP1. If supP2 >c/α, we can
verify that, for seller 1, any p1 ∈ (supP2, supP1] is weakly dominated by
p1 − c, which implies supP2 = supP1, a contradiction. Thus, we must have
supP2 ≤ c/α. Then we can verify that for seller 1 any price p1 ∈ (c/α, supP1]
is weakly dominated by p1 − c. This leads to supP1 ≤ c/α. If supP2 >
c/(1− α), we can verify that for seller 2 any price p2 ∈ (c/(1− α), supP2] is
30
weakly dominated by p2−c. So, supP2 ≤ c/(1−α). Since supP1 < supP2+c,
we also have supP1 < c/(1− α) + c.
Because inf Pi ≥ pi, we have supP1 − inf P1 ≤ min{ cα , c1−α + c} − c(1−α)1−α+α2
and supP2 − inf P2 ≤ min{ cα , c1−α} − cα(1−α)1−α+α2 . It is then easy to verify that,
for any α, supPi − inf Pi < 2c. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 below is Needed in the Proofs of Propositions 3, 4 and
8.
Lemma 5 Π2(p2) is non-decreasing on (0, supP2 − c).
Proof of Lemma 5: For any p ∈ (0, supP2 − c), we can always find an
 > 0 sufficiently small so that either (p, p+ ) ⊂ P2 or (p, p+ )∩P2 = ∅. If
(p, p+) ⊂ P2, Π2 is constant on (p, p+) by definition of a Nash equilibrium.
We next show that Π2(p2) increases on (p, p+ ) if (p, p+ ) ∩ P2 = ∅.
Suppose (p, p+ )∩P2 = ∅. By Lemma 4, supP2− inf P2 < 2c. We then
have (p− c, p− c+ )∩P2 = ∅, since the current step deals with the case in
which p < supP2− c. Therefore, Π1(p1) increases on (p, p+ ), which implies
that (p, p+ ) ∩ P1 = ∅. Consider the following two cases.
If (p+ c, p+ c+ ) ∩ P1 = ∅, then Π2(p2) increases on (p, p+ ).
If (p+ c, p+ c+ ) ⊂ P1, then we have (p+ c, p+ c+ ) ⊂ P2 by Lemma 3,
since (p, p+ ) ∩ P2 = ∅ by assumption. Invoking the equal-profit condition
for seller 2 on the interval (p+ c, p+ c+ ) ⊂ P2, we have pi2 = αp(1−F ∗1 (p))
or F ∗1 (p) = 1− pi2/(αp). For any p′ ∈ (p, p+ ), we then have
Π2(p
′) = p′[1− F ∗1 (p′ + c)] + αp′[F ∗1 (p′ + c)− F ∗1 (p′)]
= p′[1− αF ∗1 (p′)]− p′(1− α)F ∗1 (p′ + c)
= p′[1− αF ∗1 (p′)]− p′(1− α)
(
1− pi2
α(p′ + c)
)
= αp′[1− F ∗1 (p′)] +
pi2(1− α)p′
α(p′ + c)
),
which is an increasing function on (p, p+ε). Therefore, in both cases, Π2(p2)
increases on (p, p+ ) if (p, p+ ) ∩ P2 = ∅. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof: We identify the only equilibrium satisfying supP1 = supP2. As
shown in the proof of Proposition 2 above, when supP1 = supP2, we have
supP1 = supP2 = r and F
∗
1 has a mass at r. The remainder of the proof
proceeds in 3 steps.
Step 1. We show inf P2 ≥ supP2 − c.
First, we prove that ∃ > 0, such that (supP2−c−, supP2−c)∩P1 = ∅.
By the proof of Lemma 3, we know that if F ∗1 has a mass at r, then ∃δ > 0
such that [r− c, r− c+δ)∩P2 = ∅. Since supPi− inf Pi < 2c, we can choose
δ small enough so that [r − 2c, r − 2c + δ) ∩ P2 = ∅. Thus, Π1(p) increases
on [r − c, r − c+ δ).
Since Π1(p) is a continuous increasing function on [r − c, r − c + δ), we
have Π1(p) < pi1 on [r− c, r− c+ δ). By the general continuity of Π1(p), we
can find a  small enough such that ∀p ∈ (r− c− , r− c), Π1(p) < pi1, which
implies that (r − c− , r − c) ∩ P1 = ∅.
Second, we prove that ∃′ > 0, such that (supP2−c−′, supP2−c)∩P2 =
∅.
We know there exists ′ > 0 such that supP2 − ′ > supP1 − c and
(supP2 − ′, supP2) ⊂ P2 for the very existence of supP2. We then have
(supP2 − ′, supP2) ⊂ P1 by Lemma 3. It follows from the equal-profit
condition for firm 2 that F ∗1 (p) = 1− pi2/(αp) on (supP2 − ′, supP2).
We already have (supP2 − c − , supP2 − c) ∩ P1 = ∅. Let ′ < , so
(supP2 − c− ′, supP2 − c) ∩ P1 = ∅.
On (supP2 − c − ′, supP2 − c), by the equal-profit condition, we have
Π2(p) = p(1−F ∗1 (p+ c))+αp(F ∗1 (p+ c)−F ∗1 (p)) = αp(1−F ∗1 (p))+ pi2(1−α)pα(p+c) ,
which is an increasing function on (supP2 − c− ′, supP2 − c), where F ∗1 (p)
is constant. This implies (supP2 − c− ′, supP2 − c) ∩ P2 = ∅.
Third, by Lemma 5 Π2(p) is non-decreasing when p < supP2 − c. The
above result implies that ∀p < supP2 − c, Π2(p) < pi2, and thus p /∈ P2.
Hence inf P2 ≥ supP2 − c = r − c.
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Step 2. We next show that P1 and P2 are convex. For any (p, p+ε) ⊂ P1,
by Lemma 3 we must have (p, p + ε) ⊂ P2 since we have just shown that
inf P2 ≥ r− c in Step 1. Likewise, for any (p, p+ ε) ⊂ P2, we must also have
(p, p + ε) ⊂ P1. Therefore, Cl(P1) = Cl(P2), where Cl(P ) is the closure of
set P , and hence inf P1 = inf P2. Now suppose (p, p + ε) ∩ Pi = ∅ for some
p > r − c. Then we must have (p, p+ ε) ∩ Pj = ∅, which implies that Πi(p)
is increasing on (p, p + ε). However, Lemma 1 implies that Π1(p) is always
continuous and Π2(p) is also continuous on (r − c, r). We thus have reached
a contradiction to the equal-profit condition of an equilibrium. Therefore,
there can not be any hole in Pi, i.e., Pi is convex, i = 1, 2.
Step 3. We derive the exact form of the equilibrium using the equal-profit
condition. For p ∈ P1, we have Π1(p) = p[1−F ∗2 (p)]+ (1−α)pF ∗2 (p) = p[1−
αF ∗2 (p)]. At p = r, we obtain pi1 = r(1−α). So F ∗2 (p) = (1/α)[1−r(1−α)/p].
Setting F ∗2 (p) = 0 gives inf P1 = inf P2 = r(1 − α). We also have Π2(p) =
αp[1 − F ∗1 (p)], for p ∈ P2. Let p → r(1 − α), we have pi2 = r(1 − α)α, and
hence F ∗1 (p) = 1− r(1− α)/p.
Lastly, for the above to be an equilibrium, any price below r − c must
be a dominated strategy for seller 2, i.e., Π2(r − c − ε) < r(1 − α)α. When
ε → 0, this inequality becomes (r − c)(1 − α) + (r − c)α2 < r(1 − α)α, or
equivalently, r/c < s(α) ≡ (1 − α + α2)/(1 − 2α + 2α2). This gives the
condition on the parameters for Type-I Equilibrium to hold. Furthermore,
from the above construction process, it is evident that Type-I Equilibrium is
the only equilibrium under this condition. Q.E.D.
Comparative Statics in Equilibrium II.
The expected prices charged by the sellers are Ep1 =
pi2
α
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 ) +
pi2
1−α ln(
(1−α)(r−c)
pi1−c(1−α) )+
cpi2
pi1−c(1−α)+
pi2−rα
1−α andEp2 =
pi1
α
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 )+
pi1
1−α ln(
r(1−α)
pi1
)+
cpi1
r(1−α) − c. The expected price a loyal consumer pays is
Epl =
∫ r
pi1
1−α
x(1 − F ∗2 (x − c))dF ∗1 (x) +
∫ r−c
pi1
1−α−c
x(1 − F ∗1 (x + c))dF ∗2 (x) +∫ pi1
1−α
pi2
α
xdF ∗1 (x) + r(1 − F ∗2 (r − c))( pi2−α(r−c)(1−α)(r−c)). The expected price a switcher
pays is
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Eps =
∫ r−c
pi1
1−α−c
xdF ∗2 (x) +
∫ pi1
1−α
pi2
α
xdG(x) = pi1
1−a ln(
r(1−α)
pi1
) − c + cpi1
r(1−α) −
pi2(1−α)
α2
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 ) +
2
α2
(αpi1 − (1− α)pi2), where G(x) = 1− (1− F ∗1 (x))(1−
F ∗2 (x)).
Comparative Statics in Equilibrium III.
The expected prices charged by the two sellers are Ep1 =
pi2
α
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 )+
pi2
1−α ln(
(1−α)pi2
α(pi1−c(1−α)))+
cpi2
pi1−c(1−α)− cα1−α andEp2 = pi1α ln( αpi1(1−α)pi2 )+ pi11−α ln(
(1−α)(pi2+cα)
αpi1
)+
cαpi1
(1−α)(pi2+cα) − c. On average a loyal consumer pays
Epl =
∫ pi2
α
+c
pi1
1−α
x(1− F ∗2 (x− c))dF ∗1 (x) +
∫ pi2
α
pi1
1−α−c
x(1− F ∗1 (x + c))dF ∗2 (x) +∫ pi1
1−α
pi2
α
xdF ∗1 (x). On average a switcher pays
Eps =
∫ pi2
α
pi1
1−α−c
xdF ∗2 (x)+
∫ pi1
1−α
pi2
α
xdG(x) = pi1
1−a ln(
(pi2+cα)(1−α)
αpi1
)−c+ cαpi1
(pi2+cα)(1−α)−
pi2(1−α)
α2
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 ) +
2
α2
(αpi1 − (1− α)pi2), where G(x) = 1− (1− F ∗1 (x))(1−
F ∗2 (x)).
Lemmas Needed in the Proofs of Propositions 4 and 8.
Lemma 6 inf P2 ≥ supP2 − c.
Proof of Lemma 6: First, we prove that ∃ > 0, such that (supP2 − c −
, supP2 − c) ∩ P1 = ∅.
We know that there must exist δ > 0 such that (supP2, supP2 + δ) ⊂ P1
(otherwise seller 2 could increase its profit by charging a price slightly above
supP2, a contradiction). Applying the equal-profit condition for seller 1 on
(supP2, supP2 + δ), we have pi1 = [1 − F ∗2 (p − c)](1 − α)p or F ∗2 (p − c) =
1− pi1
(1−α)p .Since supP2− inf P2 < 2c (from Lemma 4), we let δ be sufficiently
small so that (supP2−2c, supP2−2c+δ)∩P2 = ∅. On (supP2− c, supP2−
c + δ), Π1(p1) = p1[1 − αF ∗2 (p1)] = p1 − αp1
(
1− pi1
(1−α)(p1+c)
)
= p1(1 −
α) + αpi1
1−α
(
1− c
p1+c
)
, which is an increasing function on this open interval.
Therefore, (supP2 − c, supP2 − c+ δ) ∩ P1 = ∅.
Recall that Π1(p1) is a continuous function (see discussions after Lemma
1). We then have Π1(supP2− c) < pi1, and can find an  > 0 small enough so
that Π1(p1) < pi1 on (supP2− c− , supP2− c), i.e., (supP2− c− , supP2−
c) ∩ P1 = ∅.
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Second, we prove that ∃′ > 0, such that (supP2−c−′, supP2−c)∩P2 =
∅.
By Lemma 2, we have supP1 − c < supP2. Therefore, there must exist
an ′ > 0 small enough so that supP2 − ′ > supP1 − c and that (supP2 −
′, supP2) ⊂ P2 since there is no mass in F ∗2 by Lemma 1.
We then must have (supP2−′, supP2) ⊂ P1, or Π2(p2) would be increas-
ing on (supP2− ′, supP2). Applying the equal profit condition for firm 2 on
(supP2− ′, supP2), we have pi2 = αp2[1−F ∗1 (p2)] or F ∗1 (p2) = 1−pi2/(αp2).
We have shown that ∃ > 0 so that (supP2− c− , supP2− c)∩ P1 = ∅.
Let ′ < . Then (supP2− c− ′, supP2− c)∩P1 = ∅, and hence F ∗1 remains
constant on (supP2 − c− ′, supP2 − c).
On (supP2 − c − ′, supP2 − c), we have Π2(p2) = p2(1 − F ∗1 (p2 + c)) +
αp2[F
∗
1 (p2 + c)−F ∗1 (p2)] = αp2[1−F ∗1 (p2)] + pi2(1−α)p2α(p2+c) ,which is an increasing
function on this open interval. This implies (supP2−c−′, supP2−c)∩P2 =
∅.
Since we have shown in Lemma 5 that Π2(p2) is non-decreasing when
p2 < supP2 − c, Π2(p2) being increasing on (supP2 − c − ′, supP2 − c)
implies that for p2 < supP2 − c, Π2(p2) < pi2 and therefore p2 /∈ P2. This
establishes inf P2 ≥ supP2 − c. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 inf P1 ≥ supP1 − c.
Proof of Lemma 7: First, we want to show that Π1 is nondecreasing on
(inf P2, supP1−c). Pick any  > 0 and p so that (p, p+) ⊂ (inf P2, supP1−c).
If (p, p + ) ⊂ P1, Π1(p1) = pi1 is constant on (p, p + ) by definition of an
equilibrium. We next show that if (p, p + ) ∩ P1 = ∅, Π1(p1) increases on
(p, p+ ).
Suppose (p, p + ) ∩ P1 = ∅. If (p, p + ) ∩ P2 = ∅, then clearly Π1(p1)
is an increasing function on (p, p + ). If (p, p + ) ⊂ P2, by Lemma 3,
(p + c, p + c + ) ⊂ P1 since (p, p + ) ∩ P1 = ∅ by assumption. Then,
by the equal-profit condition for firm 1, for p1 ∈ (p + c, p + c + ) we have
pi1 = [1−F ∗2 (p1−c)](1−α)p1 or F ∗2 (p1−c) = 1−pi1/((1−α)p1). This implies
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F ∗2 (p1) = 1−pi1/[(1−α)(p1+ c)],∀p1 ∈ (p, p+ ). Therefore, ∀p1 ∈ (p, p+ ),
Π1(p1) = p1[1−F ∗2 (p1)] + p1(1−α)[F ∗2 (p1)−F ∗2 (p1− c)] = p1−αp1F ∗2 (p1) =
(1− α)p1 + pi1αp1(1−α)(p1+c) , which is an increasing function on this interval.
Second, we show ∀ > 0, (supP1 − c − , supP1 − c) ∩ P1 = ∅. Suppose
otherwise. Then ∃ > 0 so that (supP1 − c − , supP1 − c) ⊂ P1. Note
that (supP1 − 2c − , supP1 − 2c) ∩ P2 = ∅ since supP1 − c < supP2
(by Lemma 2) and inf P2 ≥ supP2 − c as shown in Lemma 6. Therefore,
(supP1 − c − , supP1 − c) ⊂ P2 by Lemma 3. Invoking the equal-profit
condition for firm 1, on (supP1−c−, supP1−c), we have pi1 = p1−αp1F ∗2 (p1)
or F ∗2 (p1) = (1/α)[1−pi1/p1]. Then ∀p1 ∈ (supP1− , supP1), Π1(p1) = (1−
α)p1(1− F ∗2 (p1 − c)) = −p1(1−α)
2
α
+ pi1(1−α)
α
(
1 + c
p1−c
)
, which is a decreasing
function over this interval. This implies that (supP1 − , supP1) ∩ P1 = ∅.
Therefore, the only remaining possibility is supP1 ∈ P1. In such a case,
however, Π1(p1) being decreasing on (supP1−, supP1) would contradict the
continuity of Π1. Therefore, ∃ > 0 so that (supP1−c−, supP1−c)∩P1 = ∅.
We have shown above that Π1(p1) is nondecreasing on (inf P2, supP1 − c).
Therefore, p1 /∈ P1 if p1 < supP1 − c. This show that inf P1 ≥ supP1 − c.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 P1, P1 ∩ P2 and P2 − P1 ∩ P2 are convex sets.
Proof of Lemma 8: Consider any interval (p, p + ) ⊂ (inf P1, supP2).
Since we have seen supPi − inf Pi ≤ c, i = 1, 2, in Lemmas 6 and 7, if
(p, p + ) ⊂ Pi, then (p, p + ) ⊂ Pj by Lemma 3. So, if (p, p + ) ∩ Pi = ∅,
then (p, p+ ) ∩ Pj = ∅, and Πj(pj) is increasing on (p, p+ ). Therefore, if
(p, p+ )∩Pi = ∅, then p must be smaller than inf P1. This shows that there
can not be any hole in (inf P1, supP2), and thus P1 ∩ P2=(inf P1, supP2) is
convex.
By Lemma 3, ∀(p, p + ) ⊂ (supP2, supP1), if (p, p + ) ⊂ P1, then
(p−c, p−c+) ⊂ P2. ∀(p, p+) ⊂ (supP2−c, supP1−c), and if (p, p+) ⊂ P2,
then (p+c, p+c+) ⊂ P1. If there is a hole in (supP2, supP1), i.e. ∃(p, p+) ⊂
(supP2, supP1) such that (p, p + ) ∩ P1 = ∅, then (p− c, p− c + ) ∩ P2 =
36
∅. Thus, Π1(p1) is increasing on such a hole (p, p + ). Since Π1(p1) is
continuous, we can conclude that no hole exists in (supP2, supP1). Thus
(supP2, supP1) ⊂ P1 is convex. Combining this with (inf P1, supP2) being
convex, we see that P1 is convex.
Since (supP2, supP1) ⊂ P1 is convex, by Lemma 3 P2−P1∩P2 = (supP2−
c, supP1 − c) ⊂ P2, which is also convex. From this, we also have inf P2 =
supP2 − c. Q.E.D.
Note: Lemmas 6-8 do not depend on whether seller 1’s strategy has a
mass at supP1 = r or not. So they are equally valid for deriving Types II
and III Equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof: We are now ready to derive the exact form of Type-II equilibrium,
i.e., the type of equilibrium in which seller 1’s strategy has a mass at r.
F ∗1 having a mass at supP1 = r implies that ∃ > 0 so that (r − c, r −
c + ) ∩ P2 = ∅. We thus have the following characterization about P2:
Cl(P2) = Cl((supP2 − c, r − c)) ∪ Cl((inf P1, supP2)), where Cl(P ) is the
closure of set P .
By charging supP2, seller 1 receives an expected payoff of pi1 = (1 −
α) supP2. So supP2 = pi1/(1 − α). By charging a price arbitrarily close to
inf P1 from above, seller 2 obtains an expected payoff of pi2 = α inf P1, and
thus inf P1 = pi2/α.
By the equal-profit condition for seller 1, for p ∈ [pi2/α, pi1/(1 − α)), we
have pi1 = p − αpF ∗2 (p) or F ∗2 (p) = 1α
(
1− pi1
p
)
. For p ∈ [pi1/(1 − α), r), we
have pi1 = (1− α)p[1− F ∗2 (p− c)], which implies that for p ∈ [pi1/(1− α)−
c, r − c), F ∗2 (p) = 1− pi1(1−α)(p+c) .
By the equal-profit condition for seller 2, for p ∈ [pi1/(1− α)− c, r − c),
we have pi2 = p[1 − F ∗1 (p + c)] + αpF ∗1 (p + c), which implies that for p ∈
[pi1/(1− α), r), F ∗1 (p) = 11−α
(
1− pi2
p−c
)
. For p ∈ [pi2/α, pi1/(1− α)), we have
pi2 = αp[1− F ∗1 (p)] or F ∗1 (p) = 1− pi2αp .
Combining the above equations gives the distribution functions in the
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statement of the proposition.
Lastly, to establish the existence of a unique Type-II Equilibrium, we
only have to show that there exists a unique pair of pi1, pi2 > 0 in the above
probability distributions.
Since both F ∗1 and F
∗
2 are continuous at any point below r (In Type-II
Equilibrium the only mass point in F ∗1 occurs at r), we have
1− pi2
α pi1
1−α
=
1
1− α
(
1− pi2pi1
1−α − c
)
, and
1− pi1
r(1− α) =
1
α
(
1− pi1pi2
α
)
.
The solution to this system of equations is unique:
pi1 =
c(1− α)
2α2
(
α2 − θ(1− α)2 +
√
(α2 − θ(1− α)2)2 + 4α2θ(1− α)
)
,
pi2 =
1
1−α
αpi1
+ 1
r(1−α)
,
where θ ≡ r/c. Thus, the Type-II Equilibrium we have just identified is
indeed well defined and unique.
For Type-II Equilibrium to hold, we must have these restrictions on the
strategy sets: pi1/(1 − α) < r and r − c < pi2/α, from which the para-
meter conditions in the Proposition follow: 1−α+α
2
(1−α)2+α2 ≡ s(α) < rc < t(α) ≡
1
3(1−3α+3α2)(7α
2 − 7α+ 2− 2
1
3 h
k
+ k
2
1
3
), where h = −4+19α−35α2+26α3−4α4,
k =
(
16− 114α+ 342α2 − 521α3 + 387α4 − 87α5 − 16α6+√
3α(3(1− 3α+ 3α2))√−4 + 36α− 112α2 + 168α3 − 117α4 + 32α5
) 1
3
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Proof: To a large extent, the derivation of Type-III Equilibrium proceeds
in parallel to that of Type-II Equilibrium. The only difference is that we now
examine the case in which seller 1’s strategy has no mass point.
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When seller 1’s strategy has no mass point, there can be no hole in P2,
i.e., P2 is convex. From Lemma 8, we know P1 is convex. In addition,
inf P1 = supP1 − c.
By charging supP2, seller 1 receives an expected payoff of pi1 = (1 −
α) supP2. So supP2 = pi1/(1 − α). By charging a price arbitrarily close to
inf P1 from above, seller 2 obtains an expected payoff of pi2 = α inf P1, and
thus inf P1 = pi2/α.
Applying the equal-profit condition for seller 2 on [pi1/(1−α)− c, pi2/α),
that for seller 1 on [pi1/(1 − α), pi2/α + c), and those for both sellers on
[pi2/α, pi1/(1−α)) readily leads to the exact form of the distribution functions
as given in the statement of this proposition.
We still need to find a unique pair pi1, pi2 > 0 satisfying the probability
distributions. Since neither firm’s strategy has a probability mass, both F ∗1
and F ∗2 are continuous in Type-III Equilibrium. We thus have
1− pi2
α pi1
1−α
=
1
1− α
(
1− pi2pi1
1−α − c
)
,
1− pi1
(pi2
α
+ c)(1− α) =
1
α
(
1− pi1pi2
α
)
.
This system of equations has a unique positive solution: pi1 =
c(1−α)2t(α)[t(α)−1]
α+(1−2α)t(α)
and pi2 = cα(t(α) − 1), where θ ≡ r/c and t(α) is as defined in Proposition
4. Lastly, for Type-III equilibrium to hold requires supP1 = pi2/α + c ≤ r,
or r/c ≥ t(α). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9.
Proof: Since neither firm’s strategy has a mass point in Type-III equilib-
rium, each firm’s average promotional depth is simply
supPi − E[pi|pi < supPi] = supPi − Epi, for i = 1, 2.
From Proposition 8, we see that both pi1 and pi2 are multiplicatively sep-
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arable and linear in c. Therefore, both supP1 = pi2/α + c and supP2 =
pi1/(1−α) are multiplicatively separable and linear in c. We can also readily
check that both Ep1 and Ep2 are also multiplicatively separable and lin-
ear in c, where Ep1 =
pi2
α
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 ) +
pi2
1−α ln(
(1−α)pi2
α(pi1−c(1−α))) +
cpi2
pi1−c(1−α) − cα1−α
and Ep2 =
pi1
α
ln( αpi1
(1−α)pi2 ) +
pi1
1−α ln(
(1−α)(pi2+cα)
αpi1
) + cαpi1
(1−α)(pi2+cα) − c. There-
fore we can express each firm i’s average promotional depth in the form of
supPi − Epi = Φi(α) × c, where Φi(α) is some function of α only. This
shows that the critical value α∗ is independent of c. Solving Φ1(α) = Φ2(α)
numerically gives α∗ ' 0.442. Q.E.D.
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